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Introduction
During a typical academic year, many of us
spend a considerable amount of time engaged in
activities such as monitoring quality, curriculum
design, programme or module leadership, and
contributing to the development of university
policies and regulations. Our view is that we
should reflect on this as an integral part of our
teaching and learning, and not relegate it to a
different level of activity such as administration or
management. Indeed, there is a risk that the mere
act of highlighting this activity will immediately
isolate it from, and put it in competition with, other
things, and we rely on the good sense of the
reader to guard against this. We would not wish
to contribute to the division of educational
activities into ‘legs’ or ‘streams’ such as
‘research’, ‘teaching’ or ‘commercial activity’, by
adding ‘academic leadership’ to the set.
How can we distil from these reflections
something that could be of value to others? We
could simply identify a particular task and focus
attention on strategies we have adopted for
improving our performance: for example, chairing
a scheme development committee. Such an
approach might help others faced with a similar
task. Another possibility is to identify a particular
area of theory (or literature) and to draw from this
an analysis of our problems and their possible
solutions. This might alert colleagues to possible
sources of information which we have found of
practical benefit. 
We prefer to attempt something rather more
ambitious, a narrative that arises from our need
for deep reflection on what we mean by the term
‘academic leadership’, prior to consideration of
techniques and localised theories. Such an
approach immediately presents a problem: how
do we carry out and present well-founded
reflective study in such a vague and woolly way?
Our starting point was a text by Brown and Jones
(2001, p.7) which explores the reconciliation of
action research and postmodernism:
It would seem that what we are proposing is
an unlikely match. On the one hand there is
the notion of the subject who besides being
stable and coherent can use powers of
reasoning and rationality in order to
understand the complexities of the world,
including those which are embedded in
teaching. This conception of the researcher
finds favour within various examples of
practitioner research paradigms. On the
other hand, there is the fragmented subject,
with its multiple selves, implied by
poststructuralist theories. 
This seems to encapsulate many of the issues
and suggests that reflection on the implications of
postmodernism may provide some valuable
insights. Note that our willingness to read about
postmodernism in no way suggests we are
‘embracing’ it. Indeed, we are minded to agree
with Latour (1993): ‘We have never been modern’.
For our purposes, a working identification of
‘postmodern’ is that of Lather (1991, p.4): ‘the
larger cultural shifts of a post-industrial, post-
colonial era’.
We present some of the ideas that we have
encountered in our exploration of postmodernism
and indicate how they impact on our perception
of academic leadership, starting in the next
section with an exploration of the key concepts
of the status of theories, narratives and
bureaucracies. Arising from this is the concept
of ‘performativity’, and in the following section
we move on to discuss current trends in
academic leadership in the light of this. One
danger of looking at something new (to us) is
that we might start to see the whole world in
these terms, so we have included a section in
which we force a reconciliation of some of
these ideas with a familiar approach that we
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have found helpful in the past, namely
considering education as a design-based
activity. In the penultimate section, we make
some of these ideas more concrete by
discussing one specific aspect of academic
leadership, namely curriculum design, in the
context of the issues raised. Finally, in the
conclusions, we pull these ideas together and
offer a personal reflection on some implications
of this approach.
From grand narratives to bureaucracies
There is little doubt that the past two decades
have seen an acceleration in the drive towards
‘reflective practice’ in education in the belief that
this will enhance the quality of provision for pupils
and students. One of the problems of reflection,
however, is that we need to be able to recognise
and interpret what we can see in an image, which
may be complex in many dimensions. For
example, if we are reflecting on any activity that
itself involves aspects of reflection, we may see an
infinite pit of images like those observed when we
point a television camera at a screen displaying
the image from the camera. If we glance sideways
whilst reflecting, we see ‘new’ bits of the image
that we might not have noticed before. If we have
the ability to zoom in and out, we can view our
reflections at different levels, and so we need to
be able to re-focus. None of these problems is
unique to education, of course, and they are
reminiscent of many of the issues that we discuss
regularly with research students via the Generic
Training programme at the University of
Hertfordshire. In general, however, our students
are able to manage many of these problems by
recourse to one notion of ‘discipline’: using
specific tools, techniques, theories and methods
that have come to be widely used in the context of
a particular subject area, and hence form a
Discipline. It is interesting to note, however, that
the drive towards reflective practice has happened
during a period when, according to Blake et al
(1998, p.3):
The authority of the ‘foundation disciplines’
… of the history, philosophy, psychology, and
sociology of education has faded and their
institutional standing has been eroded. Nor
have they been replaced by any other
discipline of study; instead the personal (but
largely atheoretical) reflection of the ‘reflective
practitioner’ is supposed to do whatever job
here needs doing, with the help of a few
Introductions to Management nostrums and
Learning Method techniques. 
One of the reasons for this decline is often cited as
the move to a position where ‘theory’ is seen
within a relativist (or subjectivist) context. Very
loosely, we can caricature this as a position where
theories are no longer seen as objectively true, but
rather as somewhat arbitrary entities accepted in
some transient way within particular communities
through a process of narrative and discussion.
Once we move to this position, an obvious
reaction is to claim that we cannot ground
education on the shifting sand of ephemeral
theories (which, as a result of this reaction, now
acquire labels such as ‘the loony left’, ‘the
progressives’, ‘the new mathematics’…), but must
work with the ‘facts’. As Blake et al (1998, p.8)
have noted, it is often claimed that:
…facts are facts – they are aspects of the
Real World in which we cannot but live and
which we cannot but recognize on pain of
stupidity. Facts are not theory-relative. It
follows that educational research, if it relates
at all to the Real World, can only be a limited
process of the discovery of additional and
hitherto unrecognized facts.
There is, however, a major danger inherent in this
view, noted more than 70 years ago by García
8Reflections on Academic Leadership
Morente when commenting on the importance of
retaining a philosophical perspective in education.
If we sever the ties between teaching and
philosophy, pedagogy may become ‘seduced by
pragmatism and vital efficiency [and] may very
well fall in the error of granting more virtue to
teaching methods than to thought, and imagine it
possible to teach and learn without thinking’
(1931, p.192).
One side effect of any move away from
modernist theorising to postmodernist theories-
through-discourse is the change of emphasis in
the types of narrative we value. In a traditional
‘discipline’ we expect a ‘grand narrative’: the story
of the discipline. This will not be universally
accepted, and need not be explicit, but will be part
of a shared culture. What is valued, the status and
types of knowledge that are used, the aims of the
discipline, and what makes a good ‘theory’ might
all be considered part of this grand narrative.
There may be changes over time, of course, but
these will usually be achieved by reference to, and
refinement of, the grand narrative itself, pointing
out inconsistencies or potential improvements.
There could even be several competing narratives
(like chapters in a book) that themselves go to
make up the grand narrative. If we move to a
postmodern view, however, we shift the emphasis
from the grand narrative to discussion of localised
narratives, with no agenda for mutual
engagement. The power of a story is no longer its
ability to explain the facts within the grand
narrative, but how widespread it is: if enough
people tell the story it gains stature. If we all say
that ‘increasing student motivation is central to
good teaching’ often enough it simply ‘becomes’
– it ‘is’. As Lyotard has noted (1984, p.23):
Narratives, as we have seen, determine
criteria of competence and/or illustrate how
they are to be applied. They thus define what
has the right to be said and done in the
culture in question, and since they are
themselves a part of that culture, they are
legitimated by the simple fact that they do
what they do.
This move away from ‘foundation disciplines’ in
education and the relegation of the role of theories
has been accompanied by the emergence of
structures that constrain what, how and when we
teach. The National Curriculum, QAA benchmarks
and the Framework for Higher Education, for
example, all serve to remove any reliance on
theory. They provide instead an operational
bureaucracy within which professionals must
work. Donald Schon, regarded by many as one of
the founding fathers of reflective practice, noted
the tensions between a bureaucracy and the
reflective practitioner (Schon, 1995, p.328):
When a member of a bureaucracy embarks
on a course of reflective practice, allowing
himself to experience confusion and
uncertainty, subjecting his frames and
theories to conscious criticism and change,
he may increase his capacity to contribute to
significant organizational learning, but he also
becomes, by the same token, a danger to
the stable system of rules and procedures
within which he is expected to deliver his
technical expertise.
The present era, where institutions are
promoting an agenda of reflective practice
whilst strengthening the bureaucratic structures
within which this takes place, is proving
challenging for both institutions and individuals,
with academic managers often in the
uncomfortable position of trying to reconcile
the irreconcilable. 
We stress that we are not claiming that
education (as a discipline) no longer has
foundation disciplines – indeed, as one of the
referees pointed out when commenting on an
earlier draft of this paper, these continue to
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form the backbone of RAE submissions in the
education unit of assessment. Our point is the
more sinister one, that the link between such
theories and the practice of teachers in
implementing and delivering a curriculum in the
classroom has been broken, to the point where
most classroom teachers are no longer
formally versed in a range of such theories, nor
(self-)consciously aware of this lack. Nature
abhors a vacuum, and operational
bureaucracies are not ‘theory independent’. So
practitioners with no prior ‘inoculation’ of
received theory are in danger of developing
their own ‘inappropriate’ instrumental theories
in an unselfconscious way. We may be
developing a ‘folk pedagogy’, akin to the ‘folk
psychology’ often cited as governing the
behaviours of everyday actions, but elevating it
to the status of underpinning professional
practice. As Bruner has noted (1996, p.46),
such ‘folk pedagogy’ reflects:
…wired-in human tendencies and some
deeply ingrained beliefs…in theorizing
about the practice of education in the
classroom, [teacher educators] had better
take into account the folk theories that
those engaged in teaching and learning
already have.
We would argue that in HE, although folk
theories are typically derided within their own
disciplines, academic leaders have to operate
in a domain where folk pedagogy is rife but
rarely acknowledged.
The desire to move away from ‘wasting time
on theory’ to a position where we deal with ‘factual
information’ or ‘statistics’ misses the point that all
observations of ‘the real world’ are theory-laden.
Whether those observations are grounded in the
terminology of the National Curriculum, HEFCE
funding formulae or the current quality guidelines,
actions based on them are only well-founded with
respect to a particular theory-laden contextual
interpretation.
From grand educational values 
to performativity
One result of the changing status of theory-
laden knowledge and the emergence of
bureaucracies to replace grand narratives is
the acceptance of performativity. An activity
becomes evaluated in terms of its contribution
to the performance of the system that
embraces it. Lyotard (1984, p.48) argues that
precisely the same ideas impact education,
and that in attempting to answer questions
relating to educational provision: 
If the performativity of the supposed
social system is taken as the criterion of
relevance…higher education becomes a
subsystem of the social system, and the
same performativity criterion is applied to
each of these problems.
If we ask, for example, what should we teach
our students, the answers are judged against
the criteria of performativity in society prevalent
at the time, typically wealth creation. This
process in action can be seen quite clearly in
many events. For example, the EU white paper
on ‘Teaching and Learning’ (EU, 1995, p.27)
boldly stated that we have reached:
…the end of the debate on educational
principles. Heated debates concerning
the organization of education and training
systems…now appear to have come to
an end…Moving towards the learning
society is a twofold challenge. The first
challenge is economic. [ The second
challenge is] to avert a rift in society. 
Thus economic wellbeing and security are
transmitted from particular aspirations of
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society to the metrics by which we should
judge education.
It is important to stress that this move
towards performativity is not merely a simple
change in the underlying values of education.
The ethos is such that every individual aspect
of education must be capable of being judged
in isolation against these criteria. Each lesson
should have ‘learning outcomes’ which clearly
demonstrate that something of ‘value’ has
been achieved, each curriculum should
explicitly assist students with their career
planning, all research students should be
taught entrepreneurial skills, so they can exploit
their research results effectively, and so on.
It is often taken for granted that if we all do
‘well’ at the little things against clearly identified
metrics, the system as a whole will perform
‘well’ against these same metrics. This
assumption is fundamentally flawed. Heylighen
(1992) provides an excellent example of where
such reasoning lets us down. Wolves hunt in a
pack collectively and then all members of the
pack share in the ‘kill’. It is not unreasonable to
assume that a good metric for pack
performance might be to optimise the return of
food against the expenditure of energy in
hunting. Consider the impact of allowing every
individual wolf to be driven by the same metric:
the optimal performance for each individual is
to avoid spending any energy on the hunt, but
to share in the rewards anyway. This exposes
the basic rule that in many systems of this type
‘local optimisation does not always lead to
global optimisation’. We invite the reader to
consider whether a system that measures the
performance of teachers and institutions at
every level by the examination success of
students leads to an educational system where
an optimal number of students are successful
in these terms.
We can contrast this performative view 
with one that considers education from the
perspective of praxis, where rather than
thinking purely instrumentally (we are educating
students to fill their roles in society), we accept
that education is one of the purposes for which
civilised society exists. In a very informative
discussion of the role of philosophy in Spanish
education, Jover (2001, p.375) notes that:
the second [of two] consequence[s] of
understanding education as a kind of
praxis is that it implies thinking of the
educator as someone who is not purely
neutral regarding the values being
encouraged. Educators are not merely
executors of pre-designed steps; they are
committed to the welfare of the person in
their charge. 
This resonates with an interesting discussion
(Blake et al, 1998, pp.81-89) on the subtle
differences between ‘giving’ a lesson (or
lecture) and ‘delivering’ a lesson. 
From shared experience to loss of innocence
The move from teachers working largely as
individuals to working as part of a performativity-
based bureaucracy reminds us of a similar
discussion in the context of design. Alexander
(1964), writing from the perspective of
architecture and town planning, makes the
point that many design activities start out as
unselfconscious and take place in primitive
societies where people work within their own
communities and practice is handed down as
‘rules of thumb’ or perhaps encoded into
dogma. These rules are not static, but change
slowly. The designer can adapt immediately to
particular problems but there is a damping
effect of tradition, as Alexander states (1964,
p.52): 
Rigid tradition and immediate action may
seem contradictory. But it is the very
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contrast between these two which makes
the process self-adjusting. 
The designer does not reflect on the process of
design, but acts on the basis of immediately
available facts. 
It seems to us that Higher Education has
been through this phase. Many of us learnt to
‘lecture’ by a process of doing unto others
what our lecturers did to us. There was change,
of course, but this was slow and localised
within our disciplines. Most new lecturers in a
discipline had studied within that discipline,
and so had the shared rules to fall back on.
Cyert, as recently as 1980, noted that (Cyert,
1980, p.7):
Perhaps the most difficult organization to
change in society is the university. Scratch
a professor from any discipline and you
will receive a lecture on how business
organizations, churches, governments etc.
should reform. Yet universities ignore 
the problems of education in their 
own institutions.
With the move to self-conscious design,
however, the designer is asked to take explicit
action on behalf of some other person or
community. Responsibility for the design clearly
resides with the designer, the problems are
likely to be complex and hence require analysis
and abstraction processes and, significantly,
the designer may be working at some distance
from the problem and so not obtain immediate
feedback. We would argue that current
education in universities in the UK has moved to
this position. We no longer move seamlessly up
the ladder of a discipline, we create new
disciplines (Computer Science, Sports Science,
Media Studies…) and new abstractions
(generic skills, personal development planning,
blended learning…), and have to deploy these
within a framework passed on to us by those
outside our traditional cultures (such as the
QAA or the HEA). 
The rewards for our actions are now often
seen as located in the subsequent employment
of the student, from which we receive no direct
feedback. This transition causes significant
problems for the designer, who can no longer
transfer responsibility for failure to the rules (or
the Gods), but must accept a ‘loss of
innocence’. Alexander (1964) notes two
responses that frightened designers may use
to try and escape this loss of innocence: refuge
in genius and refuge in style. 
Educational refuge in genius can be
summarised by statements such as ‘good
teachers are born not made’. Our ability to act
as professionals is ‘given’ to us, so if we are
inadequate it is not our fault. If the Muse of
Education fails us one day, so be it. What is
more, reflective practice is dangerous as the
mere act of thinking about our actions may
destroy the gifts that make them possible.
Refuge in style is perhaps more widespread
in Higher Education and manifests itself in
various subtle ways. For example, once we
have claimed to embrace ‘student-centred
learning’, ‘action learning’ or ‘back to basics’,
we have a ready-made refuge for escaping the
implications of our actions. It may well be that
the movement we adopted was ill-founded, but
that was clearly not our fault, and no one can
criticise us for using something so respectable,
can they? This, of course, was often cited as the
reason for IBM’s sustained world domination of
the computing market during the 1980s: ‘you
can’t be blamed for buying an IBM’ – the
unspoken implication being that anything else is
a risk you are taking personally. 
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Grounding the discussion in 
curriculum design
Let us now briefly attempt to give a more
concrete account of how such reflections
impact the academic leadership task of
curriculum leadership in Computer Science,
with the aim of promoting discussion.
First, let us ask ‘who should carry out
curriculum design?’ This question is
fundamental to the process, and yet we are not
aware of any real discussion that has ever taken
place on the topic (presumably because it is not
directly observable and hence does not figure in
a performative approach). We have encountered
a wide range of approaches to forming a design
team, ranging from the small team of subject
experts, through a medium-size team with a
deliberately chosen range of backgrounds and
skills, to a large group consisting of anyone
that is interested. We have seen team
members nominated by interested groups, or
recruited by a general call sent out for anyone
who is interested, or identified by managers.
Selecting the right team is, of course, wrapped
up in issues such as your view of knowledge (if
you believe the primary role of the curriculum is
to deliver that which is inherent in the discipline,
you may choose subject experts) and
democracy (if you believe the curriculum needs
to be owned by the staff teaching it, you may
want wide representation). If you are driven by
performativity conditions, you may view team
selection as the task of selecting the best
performers in those terms. We have
encountered one curriculum design project
where the result was far from ideal, no single
person on the team accepted responsibility for
the design, and the general view was that the
problems all arose out of the need to
‘compromise’. There was, of course, no need
at all to reach a compromise, but the fact that
the team was perceived by its members as
representing various factions meant that the
need for compromise had erroneously been
assumed. This can be viewed as an example of
seeking to optimise local satisfaction but failing
to achieve global satisfaction.
What do we mean by ‘curriculum design’
at the University of Hertfordshire, or indeed 
is it important that we have a common
understanding of the term? If we believe we are
really designing the delivery of a curriculum, we
need to identify the source of that curriculum
(professional bodies, other institutions,
benchmark statements, the literature, student
demand, employer requirements). If we believe
the curriculum is not ‘given’ but constructed,
what principles and values underpin this
construction? This may seem like idle navel-
gazing, with no real benefit for practice. We
would disagree. Philosophy of education:
cannot be taken as a tasteful ornament 
for a few select minds. Rather it
constitutes the very first moment – looking
at the ends to be achieved – of any
educational task, since it lets us determine
the structure of the educational process,
the criteria for action, and the essential
goals that must be sought and met.
(García Morente, 1931, p.371)
The outcomes of our deliberations here are
crucial to our choice of design approach. If we
believe that our curriculum is rooted in our
discipline, then we might expect a grand
narrative to guide our design, with components
that must be in every curriculum, and we
should expect marked similarity with curricula
at other institutions. If we sign up to the
performativity agenda, we may wish to identify
the observable metrics against which we wish
to be judged, and play the game of maximising
our performance against these. 
We should be careful, however, for in a
subject like Computer Science it is far from
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obvious what society really requires from us. 
In the 1980s, for example, when there was an
imperative to produce a skilled workforce ab
initio for the rapidly developing computer
industry, there was a tendency towards short-
term goals. In the words of Harlan Mills (1980,
p.1161), one of the leading authorities on
educating an industrial workforce for
computing in the USA: 
There are any number of courses which
will comfort rather than educate. They are
‘practical’, ‘easy to understand’, ‘the latest
techniques’. On attendance programmers
discover various new names for common
sense, superficial ideas, and thereby
conclude, with much comfort and relief,
that they have been up to date all the time.
But unfortunately for the country, these
programmers have not only learned very
little, but they have been reinforced in the
very attitude that they have little to learn.
Of course, such courses are likely to
‘perform’ well: the students are motivated and
will assert that the learning outcomes have all
been met. Once again local optimisation leads
to suboptimal global performance. 
What of our curriculum structures? Many of
these will be given through the constraints of the
institution, so should we question these, or
simply accept them and be grateful for the
refuges they imply? For example, it is far from
obvious that an undergraduate curriculum maps
automatically on to three ‘levels’, or that we can
structure affairs so that students ‘progress’
through these in a sensible way. Is it not
possible that some important aspect of the
curriculum could be introduced in the first year,
but only be properly understood after some
related topics have been developed in later
years? In which case, how do we write learning
outcomes to reflect this? If we include the topic
in the learning outcomes for level one, it must be
assessed. If we omit it, it may not be covered (or
students may opt out as it will not impact on
their performance). Perhaps learning outcomes
are not an ideal tool for describing a curriculum. 
This leads on naturally to a consideration of
‘assessment’. Why do we do it? There are
numerous sources of information that tell us
‘how to do it well’, but what do we do it for? Is it
even possible to do something ‘well’ without a
clear understanding of why we are doing it?
Perhaps this is another example of the
assumption that if we all work well locally, the
system will be well globally. Note that the
importance of assessment is so clearly stressed
in so many narratives, that it clearly ‘is’, but why
it is important, and to whom, is somewhat less
clear. Sometimes we use the term ‘formative
assessment’ to indicate feedback to students,
but how does this differ from any other form of
interaction with students? Perhaps we take
refuge in this term: many of us can appreciate
the value and purpose of interacting with
students in ways that help them to evaluate their
performance and hence learn from their
experiences. By labelling such interaction
‘assessment’ perhaps we seek to make other
activities more acceptable by association. We
have certainly been in situations where, upon
criticising the foundations of a particular
curriculum’s assessment strategy, for example,
the counter-argument has been constructed by
reference to feedback alone. 
Finally, let us consider the issue of student
motivation and engagement. Informal
discussions with colleagues both nationally and
internationally suggest that this is one of the
areas of greatest concern at present. Teachers
are trained to ‘deliver effective lessons’ (TTA,
2004) where ‘effective’ is explained in terms not
only of achievement of learning objectives, but
also ability to ‘interest and motivate learners’. It
is no longer the curriculum that needs to
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motivate and interest, but the deliverer. The
simple fact is that ‘discipline’ is not always
pleasant, and many students have been led to
expect to enjoy their studies at every moment.
We would hypothesise that one reason the
problem seems to be getting worse is that
schools and colleges are now driven by the
performativity agenda. When we taught in
schools, we were able to allow students to learn
some important lessons through failure, in a
protective environment. In these days of
performance indicators, targets and league
tables, schools develop efficient support
mechanisms which ensure that students can
often jump the hurdles without learning the real
skills of training and running a race. This is not in
any way critical of the schools, of course, they
are simply performing well – unfortunately the
criteria used in the judgement are not
necessarily very supportive of Higher Education.
How should we react? The obvious solution is to
play the game, and ensure that students
‘perform’ well, so that we perform well, and hope
that they can find employment conditions where
the employer is prepared to continue the game.
Conclusions
In this paper we have provided a very
superficial treatment of some very deep issues.
Our hope is that such reflections will lead into
discussions with colleagues from which we
may all learn. We make no apology for the fact
that this paper is not presented in the style of a
particular discipline, for one of the basic
problems of reflective practice is that one is not
always free to determine what issues will arise,
and as Magee notes (1973, p.68):
A consequence of always proceeding 
from problems which really are problems –
problems which one actually has, and has
grappled with – is, for oneself, that one will
be committed to one’s work; and for the
work itself, that it will have what Existentialists
call ‘authenticity’. It will not only be an
intellectual interest but an emotional
involvement, the meeting of a felt human
need. Another consequence will be an
unconcern for conventional distinctions
between subjects: all that matters is that
one should have an interesting problem
and be trying to solve it.
In part, we are reacting against the division of
educational activities into ‘legs’, or ‘streams’,
such as ‘research’, ‘teaching’ or ‘commercial
activity’ on the grounds that drawing fine
distinctions between different processes which
might lead to learning, such as teaching,
research or scholarship, is likely to distract us
from what is important, and render ‘academic
leadership’ into process and resource control,
with little direct impact on the important issues.
Indeed, the negative consequences of making
such distinctions may take a more sinister turn,
as Alexander has noted (1964, pp.69-70):
Caught in a net of language of our own
invention, we overestimate the language’s
impartiality. Each concept, at the time of its
invention no more than a concise way of
grasping many issues, quickly becomes a
precept. We take the step from description
to criterion too easily, so that what is at first
a useful tool becomes a bigoted
preoccupation.
Performativity occupies a crucial position here, for
once a term has been introduced, and widely
disseminated, a reification process takes place
which renders it ‘real’. Thus ‘retention’, or ‘widening
participation’, move from being issues that need
discussion, to names for performance metrics.
Thus in the frame we use for our reflections, we
take it for granted that we should argue against
any notion that ‘teaching and learning’ should take
on a restricted interpretation that excludes, and
competes with, activities such as helping
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‘research’ students to develop their understanding,
helping colleagues at a conference (or through a
journal) to see things in a particular way, or working
with industry towards organisational learning. We
take the view that a university above all else is, and
should be, a centre of learning and we cannot with
integrity accept, as managers, a position that
imposes performative targets in any one ‘leg’
without careful consideration of the impact on
learning per se.
Our position should not be misinterpreted as
requiring every action to be thought through to
‘first principles’. As Poincaré (1913, p.37) noted:
To doubt everything and to believe
everything are two equally convenient
solutions; each saves us from thinking.
There are undoubtedly times when immediate
action based on partially assimilated facts
outperforms delayed action based on
reflection, but we always retain responsibility
for the consequences of our actions,
regardless of whether or not these
consequences were intended. We cannot think
of a more appropriate way to conclude than to
repeat, and assert our support for, García
Morente’s comment that we should not ‘fall in
the error of granting more virtue to teaching
methods than to thought, and imagine it
possible to teach and learn without thinking’
(1931, p.192).
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